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INTRODUCTION
The federal securities laws in the United States frequently rely on the
notion that institution size and personal wealth are useful proxies for
investor sophistication. A multitude of exemptions for wealthy individuals
and large institutions in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) leave such
groups less protected by the mandated-disclosure regime of federal
regulation than the average investor.1 Based on these exemptions, issuers

1

Many of these mandatory disclosures apply only to registered offerings, leaving investors who
purchase exempt securities less protected. In contrast to the federal disclosure-based regime, many state
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and underwriters can sell securities to certain wealthy investors without
enduring the legal and accounting costs of preparing a registration
statement, opting instead to use a less costly private placement
memorandum as a marketing document.
In light of such exemptions, it is interesting to note, as litigator
Lawrence Melton has, that the original text of the 1933 Act and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) are both “silent on the issue of
investor sophistication.”2 Melton argues that a lack of distinctions for the
protections afforded to investors large and small “is in keeping with the
fundamental precept of American jurisprudence,” which endeavors to treat
all individuals identically, whether they are “giants” or “pygmies.”3
The statutory use of sophistication proxies may stem from a desire to
codify the 1953 Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.4 In
this influential opinion, the Court held that the § 4(2) exemption of the 1933
Act—which does not mention sophistication—was intended to apply to
purchasers “able to fend for themselves.”5 Building on Ralston Purina’s
premise, the “sophisticated investor doctrine” extended the Court’s
reasoning to a variety of contexts,6 including so-called suitability cases
where investors pursue claims against broker-dealers for unsuitable
investment recommendations.7
Several decades after Ralston Purina, lawmakers and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulators began to embrace exemptions that
substituted numerical benchmarks based on personal wealth or institution
size as bright-line standards for the difficult-to-quantify concept of investor
sophistication.8 A prime example is the Rule 215 and Regulation D
definition of “accredited investor,” which allows qualifying offerings sold

“blue sky laws” incorporate some merit-based regulation of securities offerings. See ALAN R.
PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 43 (5th ed. 2011).
2
Lawrence C. Melton, Giants and Pygmies: The Fallacies of the Sophisticated Investor Doctrine,
PIABA B.J., Winter 2006, at 64, 64.
3
Id. Melton’s title references Justice Douglas’s observation that “[t]he [1934] Act does not speak in
terms of ‘sophisticated’ as opposed to ‘unsophisticated’ people dealing in securities. The rules when the
giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
5
Id. at 125.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
If a defendant can persuade a court or arbitrator that a plaintiff has sufficient knowledge and
experience to evaluate the risks of investing, a suitability claim is less likely to succeed. See Edward
Pekarek & Christian Obremski, Is the Sophisticated Investor Theory Still Relevant?, SEC. LITIG. & ARB.
(Feb. 2, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2011/02/is_the_sophisticated_
investor.html.
8
As an American Bar Association committee has pointed out, sophistication “is a shorthand way of
expressing a rather complex thought.” Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n, Section 4(2) and
Statutory Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 485, 493 (1975).
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only to such investors substantial relief from the rigors and costs of 1933
Act registration.9
Another area where sophistication proxies based on wealth and income
appear is in the aforementioned sophisticated investor defense often
deployed by broker-dealers in suitability cases.10 Despite its questionable
legal sufficiency,11 defendants continue to deploy the defense because it is
persuasive to arbitration panels.12 It is difficult to divorce discussion of the
treatment of sophistication in statutory benchmarks from discussion of the
treatment of sophistication in suitability cases. Accordingly, this Comment
examines investor sophistication in each of these contexts.
I am not the first to note contradictions in the sophistication proxies
employed by federal securities laws. In 1988, six years after the SEC’s
promulgation of Regulation D established sophistication proxies in the 1933
Act,13 Professor C. Edward Fletcher wondered skeptically:
[S]hould the law presume that wealthy investors, who can bear investment
risks, are sophisticated investors, and treat them as such, no matter how
financially naive they may be? Conversely, should the law treat poor, but
financially sophisticated investors, who cannot bear investment risks, like
other sophisticated investors? In short, what role should wealth and
sophistication play in the determination whether an issuer must undertake 1933
Act registration?14

Commenting on the financial crisis of 2008, a Forbes columnist phrased
this worry more boldly, mocking “a legal system that . . . says people who
have or control a lot of money are automatically smarter than the little guy
9

See infra Part I.A. On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act, which, although it did not alter the accredited investor standards, substantially relaxed the
restrictions on general solicitations of investors in qualifying smaller offerings in the interest of making
it easier for smaller companies to raise capital. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No.
112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
10
See infra Part II.B.
11
As Melton notes, “Even though there is no legal basis for the defense, arbitrators seem to be
swayed [by] it.” Melton, supra note 2, at 64. Similarly, attorney James J. Eccleston argues, “[I]n the
context of a simple negligence action for recommending an unsuitable investment, the sophistication
defense is not legitimate.” James J. Eccleston, The “Sophisticated” Investor Defense to Suitability
Claims; More Frequently Raised than Proven, FINANCIALCOUNSEL.COM INVESTOR (2003), http://
investor.financialcounsel.com/Articles/Investment/ARTINV0000236-SophisticatedInvestor.pdf.
12
See Melton, supra note 2, at 64; Pekarek & Obremski, supra note 7.
13
Prior to the enactment of Regulation D, Rule 146, adopted in 1974, offered a safe harbor for
private offerings that required: (1) all offerees be sophisticated or wealthy and (2) actual purchasers be
sophisticated or consult a financial advisor. The path from Rule 146 to Regulation D can be described as
a move from a conjunctive test where wealth and sophistication were both necessary for an exemption to
a disjunctive test where one or the other will suffice. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1123 (“This entire scheme changed in 1982,
when the SEC promulgated Regulation D . . . . The new Rule replaces the old Rule’s dual requirement
of access and sophistication with a dual requirement of access and either sophistication or wealth.”).
14
Id. at 1123–24.
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and therefore don’t need as much protection. The last year proves this
assumption false.”15
Today, the debate continues. A January 2012 New York Times article
phrased the problem as “Deciding Who’s Rich (or Smart) Enough for HighRisk Investments.”16 On the occasion of the SEC’s announcement of a
minor revision to Regulation D, the article quoted a Sullivan & Cromwell
partner acknowledging that “[i]t’s an interesting question as to why
[wealth] qualifies someone as sophisticated.”17 The article opined that
“using money as a stand-in for financial sophistication is a fairly
unsophisticated solution” and offered several alternative proposals that
could make for more efficient approaches.18
The debate has been energized by recent revelations of large public
entities—treated as sophisticated by securities laws—losing staggering
sums on very high-risk investments during the recent financial crisis. Two
of the saddest stories concern a $200 million loss on collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) suffered by five cash-strapped Wisconsin school
districts and a $650 million loss on interest-rate swaps by the recently
bankrupted Jefferson County, Alabama.19
Criticisms of wealth- and size-based sophistication proxies often lead
commentators to three arguably contradictory arguments: (1) federal
securities laws are overprotective of small investors and should be relaxed
because they unfairly bar less wealthy investors from potentially lucrative
opportunities,20 (2) federal securities laws are underprotective of large
investors and should be strengthened,21 and (3) federal securities laws are

15

John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor Farce, FORBES.COM (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-sec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-networknet-worth.html; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 389, 436 (2011) (“[T]he general policy of qualifying investors by using wealth as a proxy for
sophistication seems questionable.”).
16
Paul Sullivan, Deciding Who’s Rich (or Smart) Enough for High-Risk Investments, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2012, at B5.
17
Id.
18
Id.; see infra Part IV.A; infra note 182.
19
See infra Part III.C.
20
See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Fending For Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for
Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 319 (2008) (arguing that allowing retail
investors easier access to less-regulated hedge fund investments “will not increase the risks to which
they are already exposed” and “will . . . help [them] fend for themselves”).
21
See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 317 (1994) (“Few garner less sympathy in
the ongoing public policy debate than do the wealthy. The obligation of the law, however, to do justice
to the rich as well as to the poor suggests that sacrificing the accredited investor on the altar of small
business capital formation is difficult to justify . . . .”).
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both overprotective of small investors and underprotective of large
investors and should be adjusted accordingly.22
In addition to the criticisms that wealth and size inaccurately reflect
actual sophistication, another reason to consider modifying the exemptions
based on these factors is the ever-expanding number of complex investment
products confronting investors. Nonetheless, legislators and regulators
seemingly continue to adhere to the philosophy that if wealthy individuals
and institutions have not proven more sophisticated, they can at least afford
to hire intelligent advisors and are better able to tolerate investment losses.
Regrettably, the latest SEC modification of Rule 215 and Regulation D23
and a recent SEC staff study each reflect a continued adherence to the belief
that the current benchmarks for investor wealth and size are adequate
proxies for sophistication.24
This Comment illustrates the dangers of continuing along this path
without substantive modifications by offering a two-pronged argument:
(1) wealth and size have at times proven poor proxies for investor
sophistication and (2) given that large numbers of investment products are
proving increasingly complex and hard to value, investor sophistication no
longer affords the degree of protection it once did.25 Part I of this Comment
22

See, e.g., Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited
Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2009) (“[T]his bright-line
standard is both under- and overinclusive.”).
23
See infra Part I.B.
24
The SEC staff study proposed “establishing a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers
and broker-dealers when providing investment advice about securities to retail customers . . . consistent
with the standard that currently applies to investment advisers.” SEC STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS ii (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY], available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. In focusing on “retail customers,” the study declined to
recommend applying the standard to a broker-dealer’s interactions with institutional investors. Notably,
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) provides the SEC
with the power to expand investment adviser standards to broker-dealers for all customers, not just retail
investors. § 913(f), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1827 (2010).
25
As Professor Helen Parry notes:
[I]n recent years . . . [investors] are being tempted to venture into those sectors which carry more
risk and leverage . . . . Such markets have proved to be very strange, volatile and frightening
places even for relatively experienced investors, such as those who work for the treasury
departments of major corporations or public sector agencies.
Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A Case for Greater
Protection?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 703, 719 (2001); see also Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation:
Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitabilty, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 590–91 (2009)
(“[T]he constant invention and production of new instruments and structures often make [investments]
difficult to price. . . . Many of these hard-to-value assets, including collateralized debt
obligations . . . and collateralized loan obligations . . . are so complex that accurate valuation may never
be achieved . . . .”); Seller’s Remorse? Wall Street Rethinking Suitability of ‘Suitability,’
INVESTMENTNEWS (June 3, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20100603/FREE/100609969 [hereinafter Seller’s Remorse?] (“While the definition of
sophisticated hasn’t changed in decades, Wall Street has been selling increasingly complex products,
such as swaps, auction-rate securities and collateralized debt obligations . . . .”).
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maps some of the areas of federal securities laws that rely on wealth- and
size-based sophistication proxies. Part II examines the use of sophistication
proxies in suitability cases and other litigation contexts. Part III offers three
case studies of massive losses suffered by private and public institutional
investors that illustrate the flawed assumptions of the current approach. Part
IV offers a pair of proposals for modifying securities laws and regulations
in an effort to beef up the protection of institutional investors. The first
proposal encompasses an inflation- and diversification-sensitive approach
to the numerical statutory benchmarks that represent sophistication, such as
the Regulation D accredited investor standards. The second proposal
concerns the treatment of investor sophistication by courts and arbitration
panels, recommending a heightening of the standard of care26 imposed on
broker-dealers equivalent to the fiduciary duty imposed on registered
investment advisers (RIAs) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(Advisers Act).27
I.

WEALTH AND SIZE AS SOPHISTICATION IN STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
FROM FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The protection of credulous investors was the motivation behind the
first federal securities laws passed in response to the abuses in financial
markets of the 1920s that culminated in the crash of 1929.28 In some tension
with this motivation, in recent decades, commentators have increasingly
emphasized the goal of enabling companies to access capital efficiently in
investment markets as the foundation of securities laws.29 Proponents of the
capital formation rationale see fewer regulatory controls as a means of
achieving this goal.30 While the emphasis on disclosure-based investor
protection still forms the core regulatory principle, the influence of the
capital formation rationale, a belief in market efficiency, and fears about
26

Suitability rules define the standard of care for broker-dealers making investment
recommendations to their customers. See infra Part II.B.
27
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963) (noting the Advisers Act codified the common law to prevent “fraudulent securities transactions
by fiduciaries”).
28
As Fletcher points out, the “legislative history [of the 1933 and 1934 Acts] shows that nearly
every provision was motivated . . . by concerns with predation on individual investors.” Fletcher, supra
note 13, at 1134.
29
Beginning in the late 1970s, investor protection was redefined as “regulators strove to insure the
economic efficiency of securities markets,” which entailed the “embrace” of the “goal of encouraging
capital formation.” Friedman, supra note 21, at 291, 301; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by
Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 681 n.1 (2008)
(noting the genesis of Regulation D was concerns about small businesses’ access to capital).
30
In 1978, the SEC held hearings to consider how the 1933 and 1934 Acts contributed to the
problems faced by small companies seeking capital. The initial result was the adoption of Rule 242, a
forerunner to Rule 505, permitting certain issuers to sell up to $2 million worth of “securities to an
unlimited number of accredited investors plus 35 other” individuals. See Friedman, supra note 21, at
303–04.
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tight credit markets have increasingly pushed regulators to offer exemptions
to the costs and burdens of disclosure.31
Many exemptions turn on the personal wealth or institutional size of
potential investors. A prime example is the introduction of Regulation D in
1982. In response to concerns about the ability of businesses to access
credit markets cheaply and efficiently, Regulation D exempted from 1933
Act registration requirements certain qualified offerings to accredited
investors with a net worth of $1 million or more.32 The remainder of Part I
maps the current wealth- and size-based exemptions from securities laws,
starting with Regulation D. Part II examines the use of similar
sophistication proxies in suitability claims brought by disgruntled
customers against broker-dealers.
A. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in
Regulation D and Rule 215
As is the case with many areas of securities law, the state of play with
respect to the statutory treatment of wealth, size, and sophistication is
complex and resists easy summarization. The accredited investor definition
in Regulation D and Rule 215 of the 1933 Act is the place commentators
typically begin the discussion. One of many exemptions for wealthy
investors in federal securities laws, Regulation D represents a nonexclusive,
bright-line safe harbor for the § 4(2) exemption from the 1933 Act’s
registration and prospectus delivery requirements for “transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering.”33
Regulation D is responsible for much of the private placement market
where large institutions and wealthy individuals make investments in
financial products offered by issuers and underwriters who are not subject
to the costs of registration or its mandatory disclosure requirements.34
Additionally, Regulation D is the vehicle used by many hedge funds and
private equity funds to raise capital from investors.35
The accredited investor concept was first inserted into the 1933 Act by
a 1980 amendment.36 This legislation was motivated by “Congressional
concern that small businesses should have an adequate market to raise
capital and that investors should not be unnecessarily impeded from

31
32
33
34

See id. at 292–305.
See infra Part I.A.
15 U.S.C § 77d(2) (2006).
See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 281–87 (6th ed.

2009).
35

On hedge funds’ reliance on Regulation D, see id. at 286. On private equity funds’ reliance on
Regulation D, see JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶¶ 207.1–.3.8 (2011).
36
See Karmel, supra note 29, at 681.
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purchasing securities of small businesses.”37 In 1982, the SEC defined and
deployed the term “accredited investor” in Rule 215 and Rule 501 of
Regulation D.38 The definition includes enumerated large institutional
investors such as financial institutions, pension funds, and corporations with
assets exceeding $5 million.39 It also includes individuals or married
couples whose net worth “at the time of the sale” exceeds $1 million or
whose annual income in each of the past two years exceeds: (a) $200,000
for individuals and (b) $300,000 for couples, coupled with a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.40
Addressing concerns that the now-thirty-year-old numerical
benchmarks in Regulation D are woefully behind the times, the Dodd–
Frank Act directed the SEC to amend the accredited investor definition for
individuals and married couples to subtract the value of a principal
residence from the net worth calculation.41 SEC Release No. 33-9287
stipulated that the Commission will do just that, amending the language of
Rule 215 and Rule 501 to subtract any positive equity in a primary
residence from the investor’s net worth, while also excluding any negative
equity within certain limits.42
The implications of amending Rules 215 and 501 for issuances
directed at investors who meet the accredited investor standard are
somewhat complex. If an issuance involves offers or sales solely to
accredited investors, provided the aggregate offering price does not exceed
$5 million and certain other requirements are met, § 4(5) of the 1933 Act
exempts these offerings from registration.43 For offerings pursuant to the
Regulation D safe harbors of Rule 505 or Rule 506, an issuer need not
comply with the information delivery requirements of Rule 502 if sales are
solely to accredited investors and such sales do not count toward the thirtyfive-purchaser limit imposed on issuances under these safe harbors.44

37

S. REP. NO. 96-958, at 45 (1980).
The term is defined virtually identically in Rule 215 and in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 230.501(a) (2011).
39
Id. § 230.501(a).
40
Id.
41
Dodd–Frank Act § 413(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010).
42
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9287, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29, 2011). To prevent
manipulation of the standard, indebtedness secured by a primary residence will be treated as a liability if
“the borrowing occurs in the 60 days preceding the purchase of securities in the exempt offering and is
not in connection with the acquisition of the primary residence.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Net
Worth Standard for Accredited Investors Under Dodd–Frank Act (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-274.htm.
43
15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(5) (2012).
44
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(b)(2)(i). While Rule 505 offerings have a cap of $5
million, Rule 506 offerings are unlimited. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
38
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Importantly, selling an offering only to accredited investors also
overrides the less bright-line investor sophistication requirement that Rule
506 imposes on issuances sold to unaccredited investors. The Rule requires
that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor must, alone or with a
purchaser representative, have “such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment.”45 While this use of a wealth-as-sophistication
proxy undermines certain protections for wealthy investors in Rule 506
offerings, accredited investors have the right to request the information that
must be provided to unaccredited investors in Regulation D offerings.46
The thinking here is twofold: (1) wealthy investors have a greater
ability to “bear the economic risk” of investments,47 and (2) wealthy
investors have a greater ability to “purchase” sophistication by hiring
financial advisors. Further, the provision of Regulation D noting accredited
investors have a right to request information mandatorily provided to
unaccredited investors suggests confidence that wealthier investors are also
protected by the greater bargaining power they wield with issuers and
sellers.
While there is merit to these arguments, it is hard to imagine the SEC
believes the 1982 benchmarks of $1 million net worth for individuals and
$5 million for institutions carry the same ability to purchase financial
advice or wield bargaining power some thirty years later in 2012. Adjusting
for inflation, $1 million in 1982 dollars has approximately the same buying
power as $2.37 million does in 2012 dollars.48 For $5 million in 1982
dollars, the equivalent amount in 2012 dollars is $11.87 million.49 Just to
keep pace with inflation, the income benchmarks for individuals and
couples would have to be increased from $200,000 to $474,827 and from
$300,000 to $712,240, respectively.
While it may be intuitively appealing, the idea that wealthy investors
have a greater ability to bear economic risks associated with investing does
not hold true if accredited investors are not prevented from investing their
entire net worth in a transaction.50 An individual with $70 million in net
worth or a company with $700 million in net assets can no more afford to
lose all of their capital in a financial investment than can an individual with
a $7000 net worth. Worries of this type could explain some of the
45

Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(v).
47
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,794.
48
See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_
calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Inflation Calculator].
49
Id.
50
A “100% of net worth investment” is always a possibility with respect to an uncapped Rule 506
offering and could conceivably be possible with a Rule 505 offering if an accredited investor’s net worth
is $5 million or less.
46
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tremendous variation in the numerical benchmarks chosen to serve as
sophistication proxies in securities and commodities laws over the last
thirty years and the upward trend that the benchmarks have exhibited. Just
as plausibly, worries about the erosional effects of inflation could be behind
this upward trend, although inflation-pegged benchmarks would clearly be
a more efficient way of handling such concerns. A brief survey of these
ensuing exemptions follows.
B. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in Rule 144A
Adopted in 1990, the stated goal of Rule 144A is to achieve “a more
liquid and efficient institutional resale market for unregistered securities.”51
Similar to the Regulation D provisions for accredited investors investing in
primary offerings, Rule 144A deems the resales of securities52 to “qualified
institutional buyers” (QIBs) exempt from the registration and prospectus
delivery requirements of the 1933 Act.53 QIBs are defined to include
(1) large institutional investors such as pension plans, financial institutions,
and investment companies that own and invest on a discretionary basis at
least $100 million in securities of issuers with whom they are not affiliated;
(2) registered broker-dealers that own and invest at least $10 million of
such securities; and (3) qualifying banks that own and invest at least $100
million of such securities and have a net worth of at least $25 million.54
While the 1990 QIB benchmarks have not been subject to quite the
same level of inflationary erosion as the 1982 vintage Regulation D
benchmarks, there has been a substantial impact here as well. The buying
power equivalent of $100 million in 1990 dollars is approximately $175
million in 2012 dollars.55 Twenty-five million dollars in 1990 dollars is
equivalent to approximately $43.82 million in 2012 dollars.56 As with the
Regulation D benchmarks, the QIB benchmarks have never been adjusted
for inflation, and there is no percentage cap on the amount of net worth that
a QIB can invest in a Rule 144A offering. Although the use of Rule 144A
was initially modest, by 2006 the amount of debt and equity raised under
this exemption in sales to QIBs exceeded $1 trillion.57

51

Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted
Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-6862, 34-27928, 55 Fed. Reg.
17,933, 17,934 (Apr. 30, 1990).
52
Under securities laws, there are two primary types of transactions. A “sale” refers to an initial
sale of securities by an issuer to raise capital from investors. A “resale” connotes a secondary transaction
where a holder of securities sells into a trading market for liquidity purposes.
53
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011).
54
Id. § 230.144A(a)(1).
55
See Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
56
Id.
57
Karmel, supra note 29, at 689.
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C. Wealth and Size as Sophistication in the Investment Company
Act of 1940
Similar to the impetus behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the motivation
behind the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act) was to increase the
protection of credulous would-be investors by subjecting investment
companies to additional SEC oversight.58 The statute stipulates that mutual
funds and other issuers engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities must register with the SEC while also subjecting them to a variety
of reporting, recordkeeping, and exam requirements as well as certain
investment restrictions.59 There are two principal statutory exemptions to
the burden of registration, § 3(c)(1) and § 3(c)(7),60 the latter of which
employs wealth-based benchmarks as a sophistication proxy.
In response to worries that the § 3(c)(1) exemption for investment
companies with 100 U.S. investors or less was overly restrictive, the SEC in
1992 proposed an exemption for companies that sold solely securities only
to “qualified purchasers” considered sufficiently sophisticated based on
wealth or size to not require statutory protection.61 In 1997, the resulting
§ 3(c)(7) exemption went into effect, exempting investment companies with
securities owned solely by qualified purchasers from disclosure and
reporting requirements if they refrained from public offerings.62 The
definition of qualified purchasers includes (1) investors who own at least $5
million in investments and (2) institutions that own and invest at least $25
million63 on a discretionary basis.64
As with Regulation D, Rule 215, and Rule 144A, the 1997 benchmarks
for qualified purchasers under the 1940 Act have never been adjusted for
inflation. In addition, the § 3(c)(7) exemption does not limit investments to
some percentage of net worth less than 100%, undermining arguments that
the exemption is warranted by wealthy investors’ increased ability to bear
economic risk. Although the inflationary erosion of the dollar values is less
dramatic here because § 3(c)(7) was enacted in 1997, the $5 and $25
58

See Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies with and Alternative to SEC Regulation
of Hedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 326 (2009).
59
See Vijay Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves?: Inconsistent Treatment of Wealthy
Investors Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
1, 3 (2011).
60
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2006).
61
See Parry, supra note 25, at 704.
62
§ 80a-3(c)(7).
63
The wide variation in the dollar values chosen to connote investor sophistication in statutes and
regulations suggests lawmakers and regulators have continually grappled with how to quantify this
concept.
64
§ 80a-2(a)(51). Qualified purchasers under the 1940 Act are also “qualified eligible persons” for
purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(a)(2)(vi) (2011). Enacted in 2006,
this regulation exempts commodity pools involving only qualified eligible participants from various
registration, recordkeeping, and disclosure requirements imposed by the CEA. Id.
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million benchmarks for qualified individuals and institutions would have to
be increased to $7.14 million and $35.69 million respectively to equal the
buying power of the 1997 benchmarks in 2012 dollars.65
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WEALTH AND SIZE AS SOPHISTICATION
A. Early Judicial Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication
Prior to the promulgation of Regulation D as a safe harbor for
nonpublic offerings, there was extensive treatment of investor
sophistication in case law addressing whether an offering qualified for the
private offering exemption of § 4(2) of the 1933 Act. The Supreme Court
first addressed the issue in the 1953 Ralston Purina decision.66 In this
seminal opinion, the Court shifted the focus of the analysis from the total
number of offerees to whether offerees were “able to fend for themselves.”67
An offering that meets this criteria is a transaction that does not “involv[e]
any public offering.”68 While important harbingers of the regulatory trend,
in the wake of the Regulation D safe harbor for private offerings, Ralston
Purina and the associated line of cases has been rendered somewhat
irrelevant.
Rendered similarly irrelevant by the Rule 144A safe harbor for resales,
the case law on the relevance of sophistication in determining whether a
company insider can resell an issuer’s securities without registration
evinces some interesting contradictions. In Ackerberg v. Johnson, the
Eighth Circuit dismissed a plaintiff’s 1933 Act claims on investor
sophistication grounds where the plaintiff had a net worth in excess of $1
million, an annual income of $200,000, and a trading account with assets of
$500,000.69 In contrast, a district court in the Ninth Circuit refused to grant
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on investor sophistication
grounds despite the fact that one investor was the founding director of a
trust company and another had made equity investments of greater than
$50,000 and was the ex-CEO of a company being acquired in connection
with the resale.70

65

See Inflation Calculator, supra note 48.
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
67
Id. at 125.
68
Id.
69
892 F.2d 1328, 1330, 1337 (8th Cir. 1989).
70
Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432, 437–38 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Defendants have introduced
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Plaintiffs are sophisticated investors . . . . Despite this
evidence, . . . this court cannot conclude that these individuals were sufficiently sophisticated to not
require the protections of the 1933 Act.”).
66
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Although largely moot, this contradictory case law suggests how
difficult it is to quantify the concept of sophistication.71 In discussing some
of the inconsistencies, commentators have raised additional criticisms about
the overreliance on investor sophistication in securities regulation. One
such criticism points out that “even sophisticated investors may not be able
to protect their own interests if they do not have the information they need
or want about the issuer or cannot feasibly understand it.”72 Another critique
notes the paradox of a “scheme requir[ing] registration of securities offered
to unsophisticated investors,” thereby ensuring that people who do not read
prospectuses receive them, while not requiring they be provided to
“sophisticated investors who would read and benefit from prospectuses if
they received them.”73 Finally, an ABA committee and a noted treatise have
each pointed out that courts tend to take a “polar approach[]” to investor
sophistication,74 labeling offerees as either sophisticated or unsophisticated
when, in reality, “it [is] important to recognize that there are degrees of
sophistication.”75
B. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in Suitability Cases
Suitability cases are a still-relevant context where the issue of investor
sophistication has been substantively addressed by courts and arbitration
panels. A suitability case is essentially a negligence claim in which a
customer alleges that a broker-dealer failed to disclose that a recommended
financial product was “too risky to be suitable” for the plaintiff’s account.76
It is generally true that a sophisticated plaintiff will lose a suitability action
against a broker.77 In one such case, subsequently upheld by the Ninth
71

Similar contradictions exist in the Ralston Purina line of cases. For example, Fifth Circuit case
law throughout the 1970s downplayed the importance of sophistication in the inquiry as to the public or
private nature of an offering. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 901–03 (5th Cir.
1977) (concluding that “[s]ophistication is not a substitute for” the information disclosed in a
registration statement because without access to such information, a sophisticated investor’s
sophistication is unhelpful); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir.
1971) (rejecting the argument that sophistication of investors is dispositive). Conversely, in 1980, the
Ninth Circuit labeled investor sophistication one of four factors in a multifactor test to determine
whether an offering is public or private. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1980). In 1985,
the Tenth Circuit indicated offeree sophistication is a relevant but nonessential condition for a private
offering. Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1985).
72
Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy,
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 992.
73
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1125–26.
74
COX ET AL., supra note 34, at 277.
75
Federal Regulation of Securities Comm., supra note 8, at 492.
76
COX ET AL., supra note 34, at 278.
77
See Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisticated Enough
to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801, 803 (1996) (“Although courts have been reluctant to
recognize suitability claims brought by sophisticated investors, the complex nature of derivatives has
prompted calls for expanding the suitability doctrine to protect institutional investors who do not
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Circuit, a plaintiff was found to be sophisticated in light of his bachelor’s
degree in economics, his ability to understand financial reports, and his
regular reading of investment advisory literature.78 In a contrasting case that
may function as an implicit critique of an overreliance on statutory wealthas-sophistication proxies, an ex-housekeeper who inherited $500,000 in
assets from a former employer she married was found to be
unsophisticated.79
There are two problems regarding the use of the investor sophistication
defense in the suitability cases. First, as many practitioners have noted, the
sophisticated investor defense is essentially a means of eviscerating the
suitability rules promulgated by self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and
replacing them with the largely discredited laissez-faire doctrine of caveat
emptor.80 Second, courts in such cases “apparently see no relationship
between these cases and other . . . cases involving sophisticated investors,”
nor do they “articulate any coherent theory to justify such different
treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated customers.”81
The success of the investor sophistication defense in suitability cases
and arbitrations82 may have the perverse effect of making it more likely
investors with small losses will prevail in disputes than investors with large
losses deemed sophisticated enough to require less protection. This appears
somewhat counterintuitive given that the temptation may be greater for
brokers to recommend unsuitable investments to large customers given the
fee-driven business model where brokers realize greater revenues on larger
orders.83
C. Implications for Large Investors
Although suitability cases typically end up in arbitration,84 judicial
decisions in an analogous context suggest something of the difficulty large
institutions face in recovering on claims involving complex financial
understand the risks of their investments.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1108
(“In cases involving sophisticated customers, courts are more likely to hold that no fiduciary relationship
exists at all or that a broker’s fiduciary duty is easily met.” (footnote omitted)).
78
Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1982).
79
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff’d, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
80
See Melton, supra note 2, at 67.
81
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1109.
82
See Pekarek & Obremski, supra note 7 (“[T]he sophisticated investor defense is frequently used
against various securities arbitration claims . . . .”).
83
As attorney-banker James White explains, “The risks of [the] ‘latest new things’ are compounded
by a compensation system that pays people for innovation before the innovation is proven and without
providing for individual penalties if it does not.” James H. White, III, Financing Plans for the Jefferson
County Sewer System: Issues and Mistakes, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 717, 743 (2010).
84
See Eccleston, supra note 11 (noting that, in general, “securities arbitration [is] where investors
seek to recover their investment losses”).
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products. In 2010, J.P. Morgan Chase was granted summary judgment and
awarded fees in a breach of contract claim by Controladora Comercial
Mexicana (CCM), Mexico’s largest retail conglomerate, stemming from the
conglomerate’s nearly $500 million loss on interest-rate and foreignexchange derivatives, two notoriously complex investments.85 Also in 2010,
a district court in the Second Circuit dismissed fraud, negligence, and
breach of fiduciary duty claims by the San Diego County Employees
Retirement Association (SDCERA), a pension fund, against Amaranth, a
hedge fund that collapsed after squandering $6 billion in value on natural
gas futures and losing $150 million of SDCERA’s $175 million
investment.86 In dismissing SDCERA’s claims, Judge Deborah Batts
observed that the pension fund “is a sophisticated investor,” pointing to
their hiring of an investment advisor as ample evidence of this.87
There is validity to the notion that large investors with knowledge,
experience, and bargaining power need less judicial protection than smaller
parties, especially in bilaterally negotiated transactions.88 However, it seems
unwise from a policy standpoint to suggest to broker-dealers that they are
less likely to face liability exposure where customer losses are larger,
thereby incentivizing abusive practices in situations with greater damage
potential. It is also important to remember that the industry standard
contracts governing such transactions contain mandatory arbitration clauses
that keep the vast majority of these disputes out of court.89 To the extent
arbitrators are “captured” by the financial services industry that pays their
compensation,90 there may be an even more urgent need to rethink the

85

See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Controladora Comercial Mexicana S.A.B. de C.V., No.
603215/08, 2010 WL 4868142, at *1–4, *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2010) (noting CCM had been
entering into interest-rate hedges with J.P. Morgan and others since the 1990s and did well on a number
of these transactions prior to October 2008).
86
San Diego Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104, 127, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
87
Id. at 120.
88
See, e.g., Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap “Sophisticated
Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 236 (noting that courts, upon determining both parties are
sophisticated, will typically uphold arbitration clauses).
89
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1639–40 (2005) (noting the spread of mandatory arbitration clauses popularized by the securities
industry to a variety of other industries).
90
As attorney Roger Perlstadt notes, “The New York Stock Exchange arbitration system has been
accused of being dominated by the securities industry.” Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias
Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1983, 1987 (2002); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 210 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(noting that the securities industry’s arbitration rules “have established an entire arbitral structure
dominated by the industry”); Melton, supra note 2, at 64 (wondering if arbitrators’ receptiveness to the
sophisticated investor defense when there is no basis for it “is due to industry bias”).
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deference given to the sophisticated investor defense in negligence claims
stemming from unsuitable investment recommendations.91
Further developing the argument that imprecise sophistication proxies
have led to the underprotection of large investors, Part III discusses three
case studies involving massive investment losses suffered by institutional
investors who purchased highly complex investment products. Following
these case studies, Part IV offers a two-part proposal to address some of the
policy dilemmas in this area.
III. THREE CASE STUDIES SUGGESTING WEALTH AND SIZE ARE POOR
PROXIES FOR SOPHISTICATION
It is no doubt true that “[r]egulators generally do not spend sleepless
nights worrying about the plight of millionaires who invest
unsuccessfully.”92 While we might not lose any sleep over the plight of a
large bank,93 there are also many cases of large public entities losing
massive sums on investments with risks they plainly did not understand,
including an investment fund for five Wisconsin school districts, a fund for
Jefferson County, Alabama, and a fund for various public entities in Orange
County, California. Looking at these large public entities as the aggregation
of “little guys” that they are, the wisdom of securities laws that radically
minimize investor protection based on a customer’s size or wealth seems
questionable.
Prior to discussing the recent losses suffered by the Wisconsin school
districts and Jefferson County, this Part first examines two case studies in
which a mix of private and public entities misunderstood the risks of
complex investment products and suffered massive losses as a result. The
first case study dates back to the mid-1990s, when a lack of comprehension
of the risk of leveraged derivatives94 proved very costly to Proctor &
Gamble (P&G), several other large companies, and Orange County. The
second case study involves the SEC’s now-settled suit against Goldman
Sachs for arranging a series of transactions that found two large European
banks on the losing end of a bet made by a hedge fund against the housing
market shortly before housing prices collapsed.95
91

Investors who seek to appeal adverse arbitration decisions face a daunting task in district courts
where the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, AFLCIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 362 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The standard of review for
arbitration decisions is abuse of discretion.”).
92
Parry, supra note 25, at 718.
93
See infra Part III.B.
94
While a derivative is simply a side bet on the movement in value of some underlying asset,
“[l]everaged derivatives are a particularly complex type of derivative, and their value can fluctuate to an
even greater degree than . . . plain-vanilla derivatives.” Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein, The
Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 106, 110.
95
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led To or Arose From the Financial
Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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A. The Derivatives Woes of 1990s Corporate America
[T]he risks involved [with derivatives] may not be properly understood
even by the most sophisticated investors, and I am supposed to be one.
—George Soros, testifying in front of Congress in April 199496

In 1994, numerous institutions with extensive investing experience,
including major corporations like P&G and Gibson Greetings, suffered
massive losses on interest-rate vehicles known as swaps, which likely
triggered realizations akin to the sentiment expressed by Soros, the
legendary hedge fund manager.97 By any metric, in 1994, P&G was a large,
sophisticated investor.98 The same can be said of Gibson Greetings, Air
Products and Chemicals, Inc., the Federal Paper Board Co., and Jefferson
Smurfit Corp.99 All of these companies were burned by “the investment
craze of the 1990s”100 when they were seduced into placing costly bets on
complex interest-rate swaps derivatives arranged by Bankers Trust (BT), a
leader in the marketing of innovative financial products.101 P&G suffered
the largest loss, a reported $157 million, in the liquidation of its trades with
BT, one of the largest trading losses ever sustained by an American
company at the time.102
During this period, another large institutional investor, Orange County,
California, lost an even greater sum of approximately $1.6 billion on
interest-rate derivatives in a series of transactions arranged by Merrill

96

Risks that Hedge Funds Pose to the Banking System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking,
Fin. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 38 (1994) (testimony of George Soros).
97
Like P&G, Soros suffered significant losses on interest-rate vehicles when the Federal Reserve
Board unexpectedly raised short-term interest rates in February 1994. See Lawrence Malkin, Procter &
Gamble’s Tale of Derivatives Woe, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 14, 1994, at 9.
98
As of 1994, P&G was a $30-billion company. See id.
99
In 1993, Gibson Greetings had sales of $547 million and profits of $20 million. Carol J. Loomis,
Untangling the Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 50, 54. For the fiscal year that ended
September 30, 1994, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. had sales of $3.5 billion. Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Sept. 30, 1994 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-04534,
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2969/0000950123-94-002010.txt. In 1993,
Jefferson Smurfit Corp. had net sales of $2.95 billion. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., Annual Report for the
Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 1993 (Form 10-K), File No. 000-11951, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/727742/0000727742-94-000001.txt. In 1994, the Federal Paper Board Company
had sales of $1.57 billion. Kenneth N. Gilpin, International Paper Plans to Buy Federal Paper Board,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at D4.
100
Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the
Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97, 100 (1995).
101
See SUNGARD BANCWARE ERISK, BANKERS TRUST: AN ERISK.COM CASE STUDY 1, available
at http://www.prmia.org/pdf/Case_Studies/Bankers_Trust.pdf.
102
Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close Out Two InterestRate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3. P&G was forced to take a $102 million after-tax charge
on their financial statements in the third quarter of 1994. See Malkin, supra note 97.
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Lynch that helped push the county into bankruptcy in 1994.103 An
investment pool, run by the Orange County treasurer for 200 local school
districts, municipalities, and other public agencies, suffered the losses.104
Merrill Lynch eventually settled a lawsuit with Orange County for $400
million.105
As a closer examination of these transactions suggests, each of these
entities placed sizable bets on investment products with risks they
seemingly did not understand despite their size and investing experience.
The P&G deal structure is the most eye-opening example in this respect. In
the early 1990s, P&G had a much-admired reputation for managing its debt
costs, thanks to a series of deals swapping fixed-rate vehicles for floatingrate vehicles that proved to be profitable bets on a continuing decline in
interest rates.106 In October 1993, expecting interest rates to keep falling,
P&G approached BT to discuss other products that could help them take
advantage of interest-rate movements.107 By November, P&G had agreed to
buy a leveraged derivative product from BT for $200 million, twice what
they initially planned to spend.108
It is important to note that leveraged derivatives are open to greater
fluctuations than plain-vanilla derivatives109 and have much greater
downside potential.110 In P&G’s case, they put up $200 million to purchase
a complex swap that would prove profitable if interest rates stayed within a
certain range.111 The potential upside of the transaction was shaving an
estimated 0.3% off the company’s annual interest bill for a total savings of
$1.5 million a year,112 a miniscule amount that illustrates how little P&G
understood what it bought from BT.
Even after the Federal Reserve Board’s February 1994 announcement
that it would raise short-term rates for the first time in five years, P&G
continued to put money on the table with BT, essentially doubling down on
a “wedding band” swap in hopes that rates would swing in its favor.113
According to reports, P&G did not realize how dire the situation was until
103

See Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay California County $400
Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1.
104
Id.
105
Id. The derivatives purchased by the Orange County investment pool were a more direct bet on
the interest-rate trend line than the products sold by BT to corporate investors. See Hal S. Scott, Liability
of Derivatives Dealers, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ASPECTS 271, 271 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996).
106
See Loomis, supra note 99, at 62.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 64.
109
See supra note 94.
110
See Loomis, supra note 99, at 68.
111
Id. at 54, 64.
112
Id. at 64.
113
Id.
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March 1994 when the company shifted into damage control mode in its
dealings with BT.114
In a series of settlements, BT wrote off some $423 million in customer
losses on interest-rate swaps,115 spurred in part by the existence of audio
tapes on which BT employees could be heard gloating about how little their
customers understood the risks of such transactions.116 As for P&G, its CEO
publicly pledged that the company had learned its lesson on the dangers of
derivatives.117 Despite such promises, in the ensuing years, institutional
investors have had great difficulty resisting the riskiest “latest new
things”118 cooked up by financial products innovators like BT. The next case
study offers evidence of this.
B. Doing God’s Work119
“[T]he whole building is about to collapse . . . . Only potential
survivor, the fabulous Fab . . . standing in the middle of all these
complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily
understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities [sic]!!!”
—Fabrice “Fab” Tourre, the Goldman Sachs salesman at the center
of the ABACUS deal, in an e-mail to a friend in January 2007120

The investment craze of the 2000s was the CDO.121 In a CDO
transaction brokered by Tourre, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB), a
114

See id.
Id. at 66. BT settled with most of its institutional purchasers who suffered losses on derivatives,
including P&G, Gibson Greetings, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., and the Federal Paper Board
Company. See SUNGARD BANCWARE ERISK, supra note 101, at 1.
116
At a videotaped training session for new employees, explaining a hypothetical derivative
transaction among Sony, IBM, and BT, a BT employee explained, “[W]hat Bankers Trust can do for
Sony and IBM is get in the middle and rip them off . . . . Let me take that back. I just realized that I’m
being filmed.” Holland & Himelstein, supra note 94, at 108.
117
In 1994, P&G CEO and Chairman Edwin Artzt remarked, “Derivatives like these are dangerous,
and we were badly burned . . . . We won’t let this happen again.” P&G Reports $102-Million
Derivatives Loss, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at D2.
118
White, supra note 83, at 743.
119
In an unfortunate bit of timing, just prior to the dissemination of revelations about the ABACUS
deal, Goldman Sachs managing partner Lloyd Blankfein was quoted praising the firm’s investment
bankers for “doing God’s work.” See John Arlidge & Philip Beresford, Inside the Goldmine, SUNDAY
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at 12, 24.
120
Gregory Zuckerman et al., U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17–18,
2010, at A1.
121
A CDO is a security whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of underlying fixedincome assets. The ABACUS transaction involved: (1) so-called synthetic CDOs (which do not own the
underlying assets in contrast to traditional CDOs); (2) credit default swaps (CDSs) which, much like an
insurance policy, can be used by bond owners to hedge the risk of default (or to speculate on the
creditworthiness of entities without purchasing or selling their bonds); and (3) residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS) (bonds backed by pools of residential real estate mortgages). See Philip
Whalen & Kara Tan Bhala, Goldman Sachs and the ABACUS Deal, SEVEN PILLARS INST. FOR GLOBAL
115
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German bank, and ABN Amro, a Dutch bank, lost a combined $1 billion on
an ill-timed bet on the home loan market just prior to a dramatic reversal in
housing prices reminiscent of the interest-rate reversal that proved costly to
companies like P&G in 1994.122 The transactions involved derivatives tied
to risky subprime residential mortgage loans.123 While ABN Amro
ultimately lost more money than IKB,124 much of the criticism of Goldman
Sachs concerned their dealings with IKB and ACA Management (ACA),
another sophisticated player chosen as the deal’s portfolio selection agent
that also suffered a large loss.125
Since 2007, IKB had been purchasing CDOs backed by prime and
subprime mortgages.126 Like many other large institutional investors, they
came to Goldman Sachs seeking objective advice on these investments.127
According to reports, by late 2006, IKB told Goldman Sachs it was “no
longer comfortable investing” in such products if they had not been vetted
by an independent third party or if the trades did not involve a collateral
manager.128
Around this time, John Paulson, manager of the New York-based
hedge fund Paulson & Co., approached Goldman Sachs asking it to
assemble a CDO, later dubbed ABACUS 2007–AC1, which he could use to
short the housing market, proposing a deal that would net Goldman Sachs a
$15 million fee.129 Attempting to satisfy both customers, Tourre and
Goldman Sachs responded to IKB’s skepticism about the proposed Abacus
deal by selecting ACA as a collateral manager.130 Crucially, the marketing
materials for ABACUS failed to disclose that despite ACA’s participation,
the selection process was principally done by Paulson & Co., with the
hedge fund stacking the deck in its favor.131 The SEC later contended that

FIN. & ETHICS, http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/goldman-sachs-and-the-abacus-deal (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012).
122
See Marc Pitzke, Wall Street vs. Washington: Goldman Sachs Goes on the Offensive, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,690527,00.html.
123
See Whalen & Bhala, supra note 121.
124
See supra note 122.
125
As a result of the ABACUS fallout, ACA’s parent company failed in late 2007. See Whalen &
Bhala, supra note 121.
126
See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Confident on IKB Part of Goldman Suit, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2010, at A8.
127
See id.
128
Gregory Corcoran, SEC v. Goldman: Meet One Abacus Investor, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Apr. 16,
2010, 12:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/04/16/sec-v-goldman-meet-one-abacus-investor/.
129
See Whalen & Bhala, supra note 121.
130
See Pitzke, supra note 122.
131
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2010, at B1.
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this omission and other misstatements by Goldman Sachs defrauded
investors, including IKB and ABN Amro.132
From February to April of 2007, Goldman Sachs marketed ABACUS
to its customers.133 In April, IKB invested $150 million in the deal. Nine
months later, the collapse of the housing market meant IKB’s investment
was essentially worthless,134 as was the $841 million investment of ABN
Amro.135 In contrast to the large losses of IKB, ABN Amro, and ACA,136
Paulson & Co. netted approximately $1 billion.137 The tally that best
underlines the difficulty even the most sophisticated institutions have
evaluating the risks of innovative products was Goldman Sachs’s loss of
more than $100 million, wiping out their $15 million fee, despite their
knowledge of John Paulson’s pessimism about the housing market.138
The legal fallout was a settlement with the SEC whereby Goldman
Sachs agreed to pay a penalty of $550 million and issued a statement that
did not admit wrongdoing but acknowledged its marketing materials
“contained incomplete information.”139 In the end, $150 million of the SEC
settlement went to IKB and $100 million went to Royal Bank of Scotland,
which purchased ABN Amro.140 The business fallout was a costly twelvebillion-euro bailout of IKB by Germany141 and IKB’s subsequent sale to a
private equity firm in 2009.142
C. Trouble in Milwaukee and Jefferson County
In a deal more troubling than the ABACUS debacle in its implications
with respect to sophistication proxies, five Wisconsin school districts lost
132

See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring and Marketing
of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/
2010-59.htm. Evidence emerged to contradict the SEC’s claim that ACA had been defrauded. Goldfarb,
supra note 126 (noting that reports that a Paulson & Co. deputy had informed ACA that the fund
intended to short the securities “rais[ed] serious questions about whether ACA was misled or
defrauded”).
133
See Corcoran, supra note 128.
134
See id.
135
See Pitzke, supra note 122.
136
Estimates of the loss suffered by ACA are as high as $900 million. See Whalen & Bhala, supra
note 121.
137
See id.
138
See Pitzke, supra note 122.
139
DealBook, Goldman Settles with S.E.C. for $550 Million, DEALB%K (July 15, 2010, 4:17 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/goldman-to-settle-with-s-e-c-for-550-million.
140
See Goldman’s Deep Pockets May Still Attract Lawsuits, REUTERS (July 16, 2010, 3:44 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/16/goldman-rbs-idCNLDE66F0TD20100716?rpc=44.
141
See Karin Matussek, Ex-IKB CEO Convicted of Misleading Investors About Bank’s Subprime
Risks, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2010, 6:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/ex-ikbchief-ortseifen-convicted-of-market-manipulation-over-subprime.html.
142
See Pitzke, supra note 122. IKB’s CEO was given a ten-month suspended sentence for
misstating company assets. See Matussek, supra note 141.
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$200 million in pooled funds invested in a trust set up to finance $400
million in unfunded pension and health care liabilities.143 The schools’
investment trust was set up by David Noack, a senior vice president in the
Milwaukee office of investment bank Stifel Financial (Stifel).144 From June
to December 2006, Noack invested the schools’ funds in notes linked to
highly leveraged synthetic CDOs sold by RBC Capital Markets LLC
(RBC).145 The deal involved an arbitrage strategy where the schools would
borrow money and invest it in AA-minus-rated corporate debt that would
yield more than the schools would pay in interest on the loans.146 An
additional layer of complexity was added when the lending bank, Depfa, of
Ireland, requested that the securities be structured as CDOs.147 As in the
ABACUS transaction, ACA acted as a portfolio selection agent for RBC,
along with UBS.148
Noack reportedly assured his clients that it would take “15 Enrons” to
put their capital in jeopardy and that the CDOs were as safe as U.S.
Treasuries.149 Such statements suggest either an audacious level of
mendacity or, more likely, how little Noack understood the risks of
leveraged CDOs despite being the kind of well-compensated advisor hired
by large public entities.
Ultimately, the trust collapsed, with the schools losing all of their $37
million initial investment and Depfa seizing $163 million in collateral that
secured the loans. Not surprisingly, the SEC is pursuing an enforcement
action against Stifel. Instead of settling quickly like Goldman Sachs and
others, Stifel is currently defending the suit,150 while RBC settled and
agreed to pay a $30 million penalty.151 Although a portion of penalties paid
to the SEC should find their way to the schools’ impoverished coffers, these
amounts, together with any settlements recovered by the schools in private
actions, will likely fall far short of covering the $200 million loss.152
143

See Gretchen Morgenson, Finger-Pointing in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at BU1.
See id.
145
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges RBC Capital Markets in Sale of Unsuitable CDO
Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-191.htm.
146
See SEC Sues Over Wis. Schools’ $200M Loss, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2011, at 5B; Press
Release, supra note 145.
147
See Morgenson, supra note 143.
148
See id.
149
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. and Executive with Fraud in Sale of
Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Aug. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-165.htm.
150
See Gretchen Morgenson, Police Protection, Please, for Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2012, at BU1.
151
Press Release, supra note 145. Stifel is also pursuing a claim against RBC, alleging the bank did
not disclose conflicts of interest in setting up the transaction. Morgenson, supra note 143.
152
See Complaint, SEC v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 2:11-cv-00755 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 10, 2011);
Thomas O. Gorman, A Tale of Five School Districts and a Trusted Advisor, SEC ACTIONS (Aug. 11,
144
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Like the Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, Alabama, is another
large public entity that recently suffered massive losses stemming from
unanticipated risks associated with complex investment products. In the late
1990s, in an attempt to fund liabilities stemming from environmental
violations in its sewer system, Jefferson County began issuing bonds that by
the early 2000s had a significant interest-rate swap component as an
ostensible hedge arranged by J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs.153 By
2008, the would-be hedge had resulted in massive losses, and Jefferson
County’s debt was downgraded to junk status.154 All told, they eventually
ran up $647 million in losses and fees.155 While some losses were later
cancelled as part of an SEC settlement,156 this did not prevent the county
from filing for bankruptcy in November 2011, becoming the most
expensive bankruptcy in U.S. history.157 The Jefferson County bankruptcy,
fueled by losses on complex financial investments, dwarfed even the
Orange County bankruptcy of nearly two decades earlier,158 although both
stemmed in part from a similar cause: misguided bets on interest-rate
derivatives. In the aftermath of the Jefferson County bankruptcy, the
criticism of the participating investment banks was severe, with one
attorney-banker who worked with the county labeling J.P. Morgan Chase
and Goldman Sachs as nothing more than “bag-men, furthering the
corruption” of local officials.159
The Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, and Orange County are not
the only public entities that suffered massive investment losses on complex
financial investments over the last few decades.160 As examples of a broader
2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=3523; Press Release, supra note 145; Press Release,
supra note 149.
153
See White, supra note 83, at 735–38 (“For many years it was known in financial circles . . . that
J.P. Morgan was abusing Jefferson County in interest rate swap transactions. . . . ‘[A]buse’ understates
the seriousness of J.P. Morgan’s actions.”).
154
See Martin Z. Braun, Alabama County’s Debt Cut to Junk on Credit Squeeze, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
29, 2008, 8:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adq8QPXJc5zo&
refer=munibonds.
155
J.P. Morgan agreed to forgive the $647 million and pay Jefferson County $50 million. See Brian
Burnsed, Bond Debacle Sinks Jefferson County, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2009), http://
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/nov2009/db2009118_722581.htm.
156
See id.
157
See Mary Williams Walsh, When a County Runs Off the Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at
BU1; Barnett Wright, Jefferson County Commission Votes 4–1 to File Nation’s Largest Municipal
Bankruptcy, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Nov. 9, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/
jefferson_county_commission_vo_14.html.
158
See Floyd Norris, Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond Market: From a Bankruptcy, Fears About
Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D1.
159
White, supra note 83, at 738. The former county commissioner was ultimately convicted for
taking kickbacks. See Burnsed, supra note 155.
160
In the mid-1980s, the state of West Virginia sustained $280 million in losses on government
bonds in a fund managed by Morgan Stanley. A West Virginia state appellate court set aside a $56.8
million jury verdict for the state. State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 910, 913 (W. Va.
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phenomenon, they serve to illustrate the problems created by a system in
which institutional investors, treated as sophisticated because of their size,
are disadvantaged not once, but twice in the financial marketplace. They are
taken advantage of on the front end of transactions by incompetent or
unscrupulous actors like Stifel’s Noack and the “bag-men” at J.P. Morgan
Chase and Goldman Sachs.161 And they are disadvantaged on the back end
by the diminished legal protections afforded to wealthy investors in court
and arbitration. To those indifferent toward the misfortunes of large banks
and corporate behemoths like P&G, the damage to the coffers of school
districts and municipalities already strapped for funds emphasizes the extent
to which these debacles harm the greater public.
The reaction of some members of the Wall Street community to the
revelations about ABACUS and the Jefferson County bond losses suggests
a willingness to rethink the treatment of investor sophistication. As a former
head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York remarked, “Wall Street
cannot pretend anymore that the treasurer of a small town in the Midwest
on a civil service salary and no analytical support has the same level of
sophistication as a specialized hedge fund.”162 Even Goldman Sachs
implicitly acknowledged this point in a May 2010 statement that promised
it would review the firm’s practices with respect to, among other things,
“the suitability of products for different types of clients.”163
While some commentators acknowledge that these case studies suggest
not all large investors should be treated as equally sophisticated, others
have not divined the same lesson. Thus far, financial regulatory agencies
like the SEC seem to view the antifraud provisions of securities laws as
sufficient to police these sorts of abuses.164 However, there are two
problems with this sort of approach. First, successful fraud claims require a

1995). In the early 1990s, a nonprofit entity that operates the City Colleges of Chicago sustained $50
million in losses on a $100 million investment in interest-rate-sensitive CMOs arranged by Westcap
Securities. A Seventh Circuit district court granted Westcap’s motion to compel arbitration. Cmty. Coll.
Dist. No. 508 v. Westcap Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. 94 C 1920, 1994 WL 530849, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,
1994).
161
White, supra note 83, at 738.
162
Seller’s Remorse?, supra note 25.
163
Id.
164
Events in early 2012 suggest the SEC is rethinking this position in some contexts. The SEC
announced a review of the treatment of public entities by broker-dealers. Seemingly acknowledging
large public investors are less sophisticated than private institutions, the SEC has indicated it will hold
broker-dealers to a higher standard of care under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA)
suitability rules when transacting securities in a public entity’s account. Tellingly, although the relevant
regulations remain unchanged, the SEC has begun referring to such customers as “quasi-institutional”
investors. See KATTENMUCHINROSENMAN LLP, THE SEC’S HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF BROKERDEALER MUNICIPAL SECURITIES UNDERWRITING AND PUBLIC ENTITY SALES PRACTICES (2012),
available
at
http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/upload/The_SECs_Heightened_Scrutiny_of_BrokerDealer_Municipal_Securities_Underwriting_and_Public_Entity_Sales_Practices.pdf.
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showing of scienter.165 Unless a customer is defrauded by a company like
BT whose employees are willing to brag on video and audiotape about their
misdeeds, this can be a major obstacle for a plaintiff. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, “litigation is a poor substitute for regulation.”166
Accordingly, an ex ante approach to this problem would be more efficient.
In Part IV, two ex ante proposals are detailed: (1) revising the statutory
benchmarks for sophistication to better reflect inflationary trends and the
ability to bear economic risk and (2) raising the broker-dealers’ standard of
care to a uniform fiduciary standard on par with that of investment advisers
for customers both large and small.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING THE TREATMENT OF SOPHISTICATION IN
STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS AND SUITABILITY CASES
A. Consideration of Prior Proposals
As noted earlier, criticisms of wealth- and size-based sophistication
proxies date back to shortly after the introduction of the Regulation D safe
harbor for nonpublic offerings.167 These criticisms have intensified in the
wake of large losses by institutional investors as a result of the financial
crisis of 2008. The criticisms typically propose one of two types of
solutions.
The first type argues that some sort of exam testing an investor’s
financial knowledge (or that of the investor’s “purchaser representative”)
would be an efficient substitute for the current heuristic wealth- and sizebased proxies. Typically, commentators who stress that wealth- and sizebased sophistication proxies are both over- and underinclusive tend to
prefer a “financial literary test” as a solution.168
To the extent these exam-based proposals emphasize how imprecise
the current proxies are, I am sympathetic to them. However, there are
important critiques of such proposals. As the case studies in Part III
indicate, there is a tremendous range of contemporary investment products,
165

While there are strict liability violations of the federal securities laws where scienter is not
required (e.g., claims brought under § 12(2) of the 1934 Act or § 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act), the
Supreme Court has stated that scienter is an essential element of any private securities fraud action
brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
197 (1976). In Aaron v. SEC, the Court extended this holding to cover SEC enforcement actions brought
under § 10(b) and § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980). Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, private plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened pleading standard with
respect to scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
166
Sorkin, supra note 131 (quoting Professor Erik F. Gerding).
167
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
168
See Finger, supra note 22, at 763–66; Mary Kissel, Op-Ed., So Who Needs Wall Street?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 29–30, 2011, at A13 (interviewing the founder of an online trading platform who argues “an
SEC-administered ‘financial literacy test’” would offer more effective investor protection than the
current approach).
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including everything from garden-variety equity securities, debt
instruments, and plain-vanilla derivatives to highly leveraged interest-rate
swaps and CDOs. Thus, financial literacy can mean very different things in
different contexts, as the suitability guidelines propagated by SROs note.169
Accordingly, it is hard to imagine any one exam of a reasonable length that
could accurately measure an investor’s or a purchaser representative’s
relevant knowledge in all such contexts. Given this, not one but many
financial literary exams with varying levels of difficulty and emphases
would need to be devised. While that may not be an insurmountable
problem, it suggests this sort of proposal may not be as practical as it
appears.
A related concern with exam-based proposals stems from the fact that
the staggering complexity of many contemporary investment products
means financial literacy no longer affords the protection it once did. A
January 2012 notice by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) to its members on the “heightened supervision of complex
products” conveys this point well.170 The notice offers a laundry list of
dizzyingly intricate products, including:
Structured notes with “worst-of” features, which provide payoffs that depend
upon the worst performing reference index in a pre-specified group [and may]
limit return of principal . . . if either reference index falls by a stated
percentage (e.g., 30 percent) or if any of the reference indices decline in
value . . . [and] structured notes [with] a payout structure that tracks the upside
performance of a reference asset one-for-four, but if the reference asset’s
performance exceeds a specified threshold the payoff is . . . much
lower . . . regardless of how it performs afterward.171

While it is conceivable that the FINRA members who design such
byzantine products understand the risks for investors, the idea that
institutions on the buy side can easily hire purchaser representatives to
provide them with sufficient sophistication in such contexts strains
credulity.
A final objection to exam-based proposals relates to the underlying
concern in these critiques about the unfairness of barring poorer investors
from participating in investment opportunities available to wealthy

169

The old National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) suitability rule, which was
succeeded by FINRA’s Rule 2111 on July 9, 2012, stressed that a relevant consideration in determining
an institutional investor’s ability to evaluate risk is “the complexity of the security or securities
involved.” NASD Rule 2310, IM-2310-3 (2010), Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers,
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638&
record_id.
170
FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-03: COMPLEX PRODUCTS: HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION OF
COMPLEX PRODUCTS (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@
notice/documents/notices/p125397.pdf.
171
Id. at 4, 5.
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investors.172 In light of the misfortunes suffered by entities like the
Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, and Orange County that many would
argue are not, and should not be, in the business of betting on CDOs and
swaps with public money, it seems unwise to implement a policy change
that makes it easier for members of the public with limited funds to learn
the same hard lessons as these entities.
A second type of proposal focuses on the fundamental flaws in the
federal securities laws, seeing imprecise sophistication proxies as
symptomatic of larger flaws. For example, Professor Thomas Lee Hazen
argues that “whereas regulation of investments in securities and derivatives
occurs primarily through disclosure requirements,” the close similarities
between gambling, insurance contracts, and financial investing suggest that
a regulatory approach modeled on the insurance industry would be more
effective than the current laws.173 While pointing out the general
“deregulatory trend in gambling activities” and “non-securities derivatives,”
Hazen argues for a more “paternalistic approach” to financial regulation
modeled on the insurance regulatory approach of “interpret[ing] insurance
contracts to protect insureds.”174
While many advocates of market efficiency would object to this selfdescribed “paternalistic” approach on ideological grounds,175 I do not find
such objections persuasive in light of the losses and abuses detailed in Part
III. Nonetheless, the considerable influence of antipaternalist advocates in
the current debate on financial regulation suggests an overhaul of securities
laws modeled on Hazen’s openly “paternalistic approach”176 is not
politically pragmatic enough to succeed.
B. Proposal for Modifying the Accredited Investor Standards and Other
Statutory Exemptions
Because they represent the lowest benchmarks for sophistication-based
exemptions and the most outmoded with respect to inflation, Rule 215 and
Regulation D’s $1 million net worth standard for individuals and married
couples, $5 million standard for institutions, $200,000 annual income
standard for individuals, and $300,000 standard for married couples are the
proxies most in need of reform. Perhaps for these reasons, the SEC recently
172

A recent news article noted the “outrage” about average investors being shut out of a
contemplated private offering of shares of Facebook to Goldman Sachs’s “wealthiest clients,” a plan
later scuttled in favor of an overseas offering due to regulatory concerns. Sullivan, supra note 16.
173
Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375,
375, 377–78 (2005).
174
Id. at 430–40.
175
For a sense of the antipaternalist arguments against financial regulation, see generally Shadab,
supra note 20.
176
Hazen, supra note 173, at 431.
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finalized its treatment of a minor modification to the standards as directed
by the Dodd–Frank Act.177
In a December 2011 release, the SEC announced it will exclude the
value of an individual or married couple’s primary residence from the net
worth calculation, resulting in a constructive increase to the $1 million net
worth standard for accredited investors who are homeowners.178 Somewhat
blunting the impact of the change, however, indebtedness secured by a
primary residence will not be treated as a liability unless the debt exceeds
the home’s current market value.179
Rather than a constructive increase in one of the four benchmarks, I
would like to see more substantive changes, applied equally to the $1
million and $5 million net worth benchmarks and the $200,000 and
$300,000 annual income benchmarks. These changes would better reflect
the most common justifications for wealth- and size-based sophistication
proxies: (1) the increased ability of wealthy investors to “purchase”
sophistication by hiring advisors and (2) the increased ability of wealthy
investors to bear economic risk associated with investments.
To better reflect the first justification for sophistication proxies, all four
benchmarks should be immediately adjusted to reflect the inflationary
erosion of the purchasing power represented by Regulation D’s thirty-yearold benchmarks.180 As discussed in Part I, this would increase the net worth
standard for individuals and married couples to $2.37 million and the
standard for institutions to $11.87 million. This would also raise the annual
income standards to $475,000 for individuals and $712,000 for married
couples. In order to meet the continuous inflationary strain on buying
power, all four benchmarks should be revisited every five years and
readjusted by regulations to reflect any real-dollar-value impact of changes
in an appropriate core price index. While there has been more modest
inflationary erosion of the benchmarks for the Rule 144A QIB exemption
and the qualified purchasers exemption in the 1940 Act, the same forwardthinking modifications should be applied to these benchmarks as well.
177

See Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1578 (2010); Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9287, Investment Company Act
Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29, 2011).
178
Some of the nuances are intended to avoid penalizing an investor whose home mortgage is
underwater. See Kenneth Muller et al., Securities Registration: A Revised Net Worth Standard for
Accredited Investors, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2011, at 17.
179
See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,795–96.
180
In a different context, the SEC has finally acknowledged the wisdom of inflation-sensitive
benchmarks. Recent revisions to Rule 205-3 of the Advisors Act will adjust for inflation the benchmarks
for “qualified clients” that permit RIAs to charge performance-based fees to such customers. Inflation
adjustments will continue in the future. See KENNETH J. BERMAN ET AL., AMENDMENTS TO THE
ADVISERS ACT PERFORMANCE FEE RULE (2012), http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/62df9c466b09-4597-b002-7c1c0b799949/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ba2a6c12-35ee-4eac-b10f873b72a20ab6/AmendmentstoTheAdvisersActPerformanceFeeRule.pdf.
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Although such steps would help ensure that the accredited investor
standards and other benchmarks better track the ability of wealthy investors
to “purchase” sophistication by hiring advisors, they would not address the
second justification for such proxies, namely, that wealthy investors can
better bear the economic risk associated with investments.181 In theory, no
investor can better afford to lose 100% of their capital, regardless of their
wealth. Nonetheless, there is no stipulation in Regulation D or Rule 215
that accredited investors cannot invest 100% of their net worth in an exempt
offering. To accurately reflect the “ability to bear the risk” justification, the
benchmarks in Rule 215 and Regulation D should be modified to include
what I call a “diversification-sensitive” component. Individual investors,
married couples, and institutions who meet the respective benchmarks
should be limited to investing up to 25% of their net worth in a § 4(5)exempt offering or a Regulation D private placement.182
Although a 25% cap intended to encourage diversification on
purchases by accredited investors would impede access to capital for
businesses that rely on such low-cost exemptions, the impact could be
softened by allowing individual investors, married couples, and institutional
investors possessing double the net worth or annual income benchmarks to
invest up to 50% of their net worth in exempt offerings while letting
investors who can triple these benchmarks to invest up to 100%. Although
an argument could be made that these graduated caps do not make sense to
the extent they still enable an investor with triple the minimum net worth
standard to lose everything on an investment, cap removal at a “super-networth” or a “super-annual-income” level has the virtue of making the
proposal more politically pragmatic.
Although the recent revision to the Regulation D and Rule 215
benchmarks falls short of extensive changes, the Dodd–Frank Act gives the
SEC the ability to make significant revisions in this area. After July 21,
2014, the net worth standard of $1 million will be open to adjustment by
future rulemaking, with subsequent adjustments occurring “not less

181

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,794.
Recent commentators have proposed similar modifications. Andrew Abramowitz, a capital
markets attorney, suggests a better accredited investor definition would limit what percentage of their
net worth people can invest and have “a prohibition on participation in a new private placement if the
investor’s previous investments in illiquid securities constitute a specified share of [the] investor’s liquid
assets.” Sullivan, supra note 16. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. argues that the definition should contain a
standard for diversification capping investments in unregulated securities at 15% to 20% of net worth.
Id. Although skeptics might suggest a diversification-sensitive component is unnecessary given that
modern portfolio theory has conclusively demonstrated the benefits of diversification to investors, it is
open to debate whether investors have taken such lessons to heart. See, e.g., Stephan Abraham, The
Pitfalls of Diversification, INVESTOPEDIA (June 7, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/
12/pitfalls-of-diversification.asp#axzz1yO5qSLXo (arguing that diversification may not be “all that it’s
cracked up to be” from a cost–benefit standpoint).
182
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frequently than once every 4 years thereafter.”183 In addition, § 415 of the
Dodd–Frank Act requires the Comptroller General to undertake a study
examining “the appropriate criteria for determining the financial
thresholds . . . needed to qualify for accredited investor status and eligibility
to invest in private funds.”184 Additionally, § 413(b)(2)(B) of the Dodd–
Frank Act gives the SEC authority to:
by notice and comment rulemaking, make such adjustments to the definition of
the term “accredited investor[,”] as defined in section 230.215 of title 17, Code
of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto, as such term applies to
natural persons, as the Commission may deem appropriate for the protection of
investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.185

Although this passage unfortunately exempts the definition of accredited
institutional investors from such revisions, the language allows for the
wholesale modification of Regulation D’s sophistication proxies for
individuals if the SEC can be convinced the current benchmarks are not in
the public interest.
C. Proposal for Modifying the Standard of Care Imposed on
Broker-Dealers
Under the Advisers Act, it is well-established that RIAs have a
fiduciary duty to their customers, meaning that the customers’ interests
must take priority in any transaction.186 In contrast, the debate over whether
broker-dealers187 owe fiduciary duties to their customers has been long and
contentious.188 Prior to the passage of the Advisers Act, early twentieth-

183

Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1578 (2010). Although
the statute is not completely clear on this point, the income standards will presumably also be open to
inflation adjustments. See J. Robert Brown Jr., The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the SEC:
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Dodd–Frank Act § 415, 124 Stat. at 1578; see also Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors,
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Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1578.
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See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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While RIAs are advisers or firms in the investment advising business that have registered with
the SEC or a state securities board, broker-dealers are simply individuals or firms in the business of
buying and selling securities.
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In 1999, the SEC proposed Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which would have allowed brokers
to avoid fiduciary obligations even if they did not comply with the requirements of the broker-dealer
exclusion in the Advisers Act, replacing the exclusion’s compensation rules with a modest disclosure
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century courts typically viewed brokers as fiduciaries.189 In 1940, the
Advisers Act bifurcated the regulatory structure, leaving some observers
with the impression that brokers who were exempt did not owe fiduciary
duties to customers, despite the fact that many of them have long provided
advice to their clients.190 Adding to the confusion, there is still a minority
rule holding that broker-dealers are fiduciaries whether or not they are
RIAs.191
If broker-dealers do not owe investors fiduciary duties, the brokerage
firm and its employees must merely adhere to an ordinary negligence
standard of care in dealing with customers.192 For wronged investors, this
makes recovery in suitability cases—already difficult for sophisticated
customers—all but impossible. In contrast, as a fiduciary, RIAs owe clients
an affirmative duty to disclose material information.193 If a brokerage firm is
held to this standard, it becomes a blatant violation of duty to arrange a
transaction that a firm employee believes is a terrible investment for one
party, as Goldman Sachs’s Fabrice Tourre allegedly did in the ABACUS
transaction.
While lobbyists for broker-dealers assert that the imposition of an
unambiguous fiduciary duty would seriously harm the securities industry
business model,194 there are forceful arguments on behalf of imposing one.
The primary such argument, as the SEC notes, is that customers are
frequently unsure whether or not they are owed a fiduciary duty in
securities transactions.195 There are several reasons for this.

dynamics of the debate had shifted, with an Obama Administration white paper calling for legislative
reform to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who provide advice to clients. Id. at 397.
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See, e.g., Batterson v. Raymond, 149 N.Y.S. 706, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Haight v. Haight &
Freese Co., 92 N.Y.S. 934, 936 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Wahl v. Tracy, 121 N.W. 660, 661 (Wis. 1909).
190
See Laby, supra note 188, at 400 (“Brokers have always provided advice to their brokerage
customers . . . .”).
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United States v. Wolfson, Nos. S1 00 Cr. 628(JGK), S1 02 Cr. 1588(JGK), 2008 WL 1969730,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008); Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751 (Ct. App. 1989).
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While the contemporary courts cited in note 191 supra have found broker-dealers subject to a
fiduciary duty, the typical standard of care imposed is one of good faith and fair dealing. See SECTION
913 STUDY, supra note 24, at 70–71.
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See SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that with the Advisers Act,
Congress created “a fiduciary duty on the part of investment advisers to exercise good faith and fully
and fairly disclose all material facts to their clients, and an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable
care to avoid misleading [their] clients” (alteration in original) (quoting Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc.,
277 F. Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d sub nom. SEC v.
Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
194
See, e.g., Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. &
Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman 4 (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.sifma.
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First, the long-running debate and contradictory case law has failed to
clarify the issue.196 Second, in recent years, brokerage firms have done a
tremendous amount of marketing “touting their advisory functions” and
blurring “the distinctions between the investment advisory profession and
the broker-dealer profession.”197 The continually changing nomenclature of
securities professionals has also further muddied the waters. As a 2008
RAND Corporation study noted, typical job titles of employees in
brokerage firms include financial advisor, financial consultant, financial
representative, and investment specialist, all of which call to mind the
duties of an RIA.198 Lastly, confusion also stems from the fact that unlike in
the RIA context, customers do not always know in what capacity a brokerdealer is serving—i.e., as a broker or a dealer—until the transaction is
complete.199
The divergent standards for RIAs and broker-dealers give rise to a
series of questions. Is there any justification for imposing a lesser standard
of care on broker-dealers compared to RIAs? If not, should we align the
standards? If we should align the standards, should we do so for all
customers or draw distinctions based on wealth or size?
Given the uphill climb that wronged investors face in suitability cases,
and the fact that this climb is even steeper for large investors, it makes
sense to impose a heightened fiduciary standard of duty on broker-dealers
equivalent to the one placed on RIAs by the Advisers Act. Notwithstanding
the contrary suggestion of a recent SEC staff study on this topic,200 a
uniform fiduciary standard should be in place irrespective of the wealth of
the customer and irrespective of whether the firm acted as dealer or broker
196

See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text.
Letter from Ron A. Rhoades, Dir. of Research, CCO, Joseph Capital Mgmt., LLC, to SEC
Chairman & Commissioners 13 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72599/
s72599josephcap.pdf; see also Laby, supra note 188, at 399–405 (“[C]hanges in . . . the labels [brokerdealers] use for marketing . . . should subject brokers that provide advice to the Advisers Act.”). As
Laby notes:
The tidy separation between brokers and advisers began to crumble . . . in the 1980s when brokers
started to offer financial planning services, and more significantly in the 1990s when brokerage
firms began to use titles [that] . . . encouraged customers to think of the registered [broker-dealer]
representative more as an adviser than a stockbroker.
Id. at 404.
198
ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS 74 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_
randiabdreport.pdf.
199
See Laby, supra note 188, at 400 (“Broker-dealers in the United States have always acted as
both agent and principal with respect to their customers. A broker acts as an agent, executing securities
transactions on behalf of a customer, the principal, with another buyer or seller. A dealer acts as a
principal, buying securities from or selling securities to a customer out of its own account.” (footnote
omitted)). Frequently, broker-dealers do not notify a customer which role they played on a deal until the
transaction is confirmed. 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION § 1.04, at 1-20 to -23 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
200
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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on the transaction in question.201 While the SEC staff study asserts that
confusion is only likely with respect to smaller retail customers,202 the
evidence suggests otherwise, given how common it is for large entities like
CCM, SDCERA, and P&G to assert breach of fiduciary duty claims against
investment firms and hedge funds once transaction value evaporates.203
As suggested earlier, the fact that courts and arbitration panels presume
large entities to be sophisticated means they are disadvantaged twice. On
the front end, the statutory exemptions like those in Regulation D, § 4(5),
and Rule 144A based on size or wealth mean institutional investors are not
necessarily benefitting from the mandatory disclosures of a registration
statement. Instead, they rely on the less fulsome disclosures of a private
placement memo, their bargaining power, and their ability to hire advisors.
While some commentators argue that this discrepancy does not
disadvantage large institutions given their ability to bear the economic risk,
the inflation-eroded numerical benchmarks and the lack of graduated caps
in these exemptions undermine this argument. Meanwhile, on the back end,
the ability of investment firms to employ the sophisticated investor
affirmative defense in suitability cases based on a customer’s size or wealth,
coupled with the prevalence of industry-standard mandatory arbitration
clauses, means large entities are disadvantaged when it comes to legal
remedies when investment value evaporates.
D. Consideration of Counterarguments
There are numerous potential counterarguments to the above two
proposals. First, free market advocates would likely raise the same
antipaternalist objections that could be directed at Professor Hazen’s
proposed overhaul of securities laws modeled on existing insurance
industry regulations. A related critique might be that large sophisticated
actors require less regulatory protection because the negotiating leverage
they possess renders regulation costly overkill that produces a suboptimal
level of economic activity.204 However, a key point overlooked by the
antipaternalist advocates concerns the utility of a limited form of
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Because investment firms trade as principals in addition to acting as intermediaries, some have
argued it would not be feasible to require such firms to put customers first. While an important point,
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paternalism where there are severe asymmetries of information between
parties of the kind that plague the financial markets.205
A more difficult counterargument to answer is one that could be levied
against any proposal that increases regulatory burdens in financial markets.
Many anti-regulation voices emphasize the degree to which the economy is
heavily dependent on the liquidity and investment capital provided by
efficiently functioning capital markets. Any proposal that increases the
compliance costs or liability exposure of issuers and broker-dealers is open
to critique on the grounds that it will threaten the access to capital that fuels
economic growth.206
In response to concerns about capital formation, the best answer may
be found in an amici curiae brief filed by two former SEC Chairs and a
former Commissioner. The brief points out that concerns about increased
liability exposure deterring firms from doing business in the United States
may be misplaced because “in fact, investor faith in the safety and integrity
of our markets is their strength. The fact that our markets are the safest in
the world has helped make them the strongest in the world.”207
The above statement underlines the fact that the goal is never simply to
minimize regulatory burdens or liability exposure to the greatest extent
possible. This would be as wrongheaded as seeking to maximize regulatory
costs or liability exposure to the greatest extent possible. The sensible goal
is to optimize the regulatory costs and burdens on actors in the marketplace.
Given the massive losses suffered by large entities that purchased
investment products they did not understand, the evidence suggests we are
still below an optimal level of financial regulation. In large part, this is the
result of regulators’ reliance on outmoded, simplistic sophistication proxies
coupled with judges’ and arbitrators’ presumption of sophistication for
large entities in contexts where the potential for predatory conduct by
investment firms is not cabined by a uniform fiduciary duty standard.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the question posed by this Comment’s title—should size or
wealth equal sophistication in federal securities laws?—must be answered
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with a lawyerly equivocation: it depends. As things stand, there are serious
flaws in the approach of federal securities laws to sophistication proxies
based on size and wealth. Unless the existing benchmarks are adjusted for
inflation on a going-forward basis and graduated caps on unregistered
investments as a percentage of investor net worth are introduced, these
proxies will continue to diverge from the justifications for exemptions
originally expressed in Ralston Purina.208 These justifications—the main
argument for the existence of sophistication proxies—are that investors
with certain levels of wealth have the ability to “purchase” sophistication,
wield bargaining power to extract disclosures, and better tolerate economic
risk. The introduction of inflation adjustments and graduated caps on
investments as a percentage of net worth will better serve such
justifications. Nonetheless, the lack of a clear understanding of the duty
owed to customers by broker-dealers suggests large investors will continue
to receive less than optimal levels of protection unless a uniform fiduciary
duty is imposed on broker-dealers in their dealings with both retail and
institutional customers equivalent to the duty imposed on RIAs under the
Advisers Act.
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